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407 
INTELLIGENT OR UNINTELLIGENT 
FIDELITY?* 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Imer B. Flores2 
The moral reading insists that they misunderstood the 
moral principle that they themselves enacted into law. The 
originalist strategy would translate that mistake into 
enduring constitutional law. 
 —Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law3 
 
We have to choose between an abstract, principled, moral 
reading . . . and a concrete, dated, reading. 
 —Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Value of Fidelity4 
I.INTRODUCTION 
Advocating a moral reading to interpretation in general, and 
to constitutional interpretation in particular, I cannot do anything 
less—as a fellow moral reader—than celebrate the appearance of 
 
 * Revised version of a brief oral comment to James E. Fleming’s lecture at the 
“Law and Constitutional Interpretation: Moral Readings v. Originalisms” Conference. 
This event centered on the penultimate draft of his book FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT 
CONSTITUTION, at the Institute for Legal Research (IIJ) of the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City on February 16, 2015. The Conference is 
available online at: http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/vjv/activ.htm?e=772&m=4934&p=115. 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Professor, Institute for Legal Research (IIJ), National Autonomous University 
of Mexico (UNAM).  
 3. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13 (1997) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]. 
 4. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and 
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue 
of Fidelity]. 
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James E. Fleming’s Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For 
Moral Readings and Against Originalisms. I endorse completely 
the commendations included on its dust jacket, especially where 
Richard Fallon states: “James Fleming emerges in this book as the 
ablest current defender of a ‘moral reading’ approach (long 
championed by Ronald Dworkin) that calls upon judges to make 
candid moral judgments in interpreting the Constitution we have, 
not fashioning a new one.” Michael C. Dorf also salutes:  
“Fleming picks up the torch laid down by the late great Ronald 
Dworkin as the leading champion of a moral reading of the 
Constitution. He is a worthy successor.” 
In the “Acknowledgments” section of the book, the author 
declares explicitly that it is a “sequel or companion” (p. xi) to one 
co-authored with Sotirios A. Barber, entitled Constitutional 
Interpretation,5 but remains implicit that it is also a “sequel or 
companion” to another one co-authored with Linda C. McClain 
on constitutional liberalism (as a form of mild perfectionism), 
titled Ordered Liberty,6 as well as to his own Securing 
Constitutional Democracy.7 Additionally, he discloses that 
“Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,”8 a homonymous article, 
“is the inspiration not only for the name of this book but also for 
my longstanding conviction that it is imperative to challenge the 
originalists’ pretensions to a monopoly on concern for fidelity in 
constitutional interpretation” (p. xiii). 
This article was Fleming’s contribution to a symposium that 
he co-organized on “Fidelity in Constitutional Theory.”9 The 
symposium and his response were prompted by the publication of 
Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution, and his 1996 Robert L. Levine 
Distinguished Lecture at Fordham Law School, entitled “The 
Moral Reading of the Constitution,” which was published the 
 
 5. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007). 
 6. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
 7. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF 
AUTONOMY (2006). 
 8. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1335 (1997) [hereinafter Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution]. 
 9. See Symposium: Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 
(1997). 
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following year as “The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve.”10 
In this Article, I review James E. Fleming’s Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against 
Originalisms. In Part II, I reassess Dworkin’s “moral reading,” 
and in Part III, I reevaluate Fleming’s argument both “for moral 
readings and against originalisms,” which can be characterized as 
“fidelity to our imperfect constitution.” Finally, in Part IV, I offer 
conclusions, including the kind of fidelity that moral readers and 
everyone else should adopt. 
II.RONALD DWORKIN’S MORAL READING 
Dworkin’s “moral reading” has been traced all the way back 
to the publication of Taking Rights Seriously, where he 
accentuated—in Chapter 5, “Constitutional Cases”— his concern 
with the “philosophy of constitutional adjudication” and argued 
that  “[c]onstitutional law can make no genuine advance until it 
isolates the problem of rights against the state and makes that 
problem part of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of 
constitutional law and moral theory . . . .”11 However, the origin 
of this multi-cited passage actually occurred earlier, since it 
appeared, for the first time, in the New York Review of Books, as 
“A Special Supplement: The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon,” 
which ends with a final paragraph (not included in the book 
version) commenting on the then recent appointment of William 
H. Rehnquist as Associate Justice to the Supreme Court (1972-
1986).12 Dworkin somehow anticipated that Rehnquist would 
later be nominated by Ronald Reagan to become the 16th Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court (1986–2005):13 
 
 10. See Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 4.  
 11. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131, 149 (1977) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 
(1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] (“Jurisprudence is the general part of 
adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law.”). See also DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW, supra note 3, at 2 (“The moral reading therefore brings political morality into the 
heart of constitutional law.”).  
 12. Ronald Dworkin, A Special Supplement: The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 4, 1972), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1972/05/04/a-special-
supplement-the-jurisprudence-of-richard-/ [hereinafter Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of 
Richard Nixon]. 
 13. Id. 
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist is relatively young, and he has 
demonstrated intellectual power; it is likely that he will become 
the intellectual leader of the Nixon court. Contrary to Nixon’s 
advertisement, he is not, on the record, a champion of judicial 
restraint. He is a conservative activist, who can be expected 
forcefully to argue not for deference but for a narrow 
conception of individual rights. Liberals who oppose that 
conception will need more than the old rhetoric about the 
Court being the moral tutor to the nation; they will need a 
moral theory that shows why the rights they insist on are 
requirements of human dignity, or are for some other reason 
requirements that the nation must recognize to make good the 
promise of its constitutional system.14 
In short, a moral reading is necessary to “make good” the 
promise(s) of a constitution. Constitutions are drafted—here, 
there, and everywhere—in abstract normative terms, stating not 
only where we are in the present and even where we were in the 
past, but also where we expect to be in the future. A moral reading 
of the Constitution as written based on the interpretation and 
application of abstract clauses containing principles, including 
moral ones, is necessary and constitutions should not be rewritten 
via the mutation of the old document or the invention of a new 
one. In Dworkin’s words: “The moral reading proposes that we 
all—judges, lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply these abstract 
clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles 
about political decency and justice.”15 Furthermore, as he insisted: 
Judges may not read their own convictions into the 
Constitution. They may not read the abstract moral clauses as 
expressing any particular moral judgment, no matter how much 
that judgment appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in 
principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a 
whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional 
interpretation by other judges. They must regard themselves as 
partners with other officials, past and future, who together 
elaborate a coherent constitutional morality, and they must 
take care to see that what they contribute fits with the rest. (I 
have elsewhere said that judges are like authors jointly creating 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 2. 
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a chain novel in which each writes a chapter that makes sense 
as part of the story as a whole.)16 
In that sense, Dworkin not only assumes the distinction 
between interpretation and invention, but also applies the 
dimensions of “fit” and “justification” to distinguish them.17 
Whatever ‘fits’ and is ‘justified’ counts as interpretation, and 
whatever does not stands as invention: “The justification need not 
fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, but it must fit 
enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting 
that practice, not inventing a new one.”18 
The distinction between interpretation and invention is 
helpful to distinguish Dworkin from some liberals who have 
called the Constitution a “living” document and have said that it 
must be “brought up to date” to match new circumstances and 
sensibilities. By taking an “active” approach and by accepting 
John Hart Ely’s characterization of their position as 
“noninterpretive,” they seem to suggest change and reform, i.e., 
“inventing a new document rather than interpreting the old 
one.”19 
Although the distinction is enough to insulate Dworkin from 
the “living constitutionalists,” he introduces a further 
 
 16. Id. at 10. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 158–62 (1985) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]. See also DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 
supra note 11, at 228–38. 
 17. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 239 (“The judge’s decision . . . 
must be drawn from an interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before, so 
far as that is possible.”); DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 16, at 143 
(arguing “there are two dimensions along which it must be judged whether a theory 
provides the best justification of available legal materials: the dimension of fit and the 
dimension of political morality.”) See also James E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and Fidelity 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1283 (2013), reprinted in 9 PROBLEMA: 
ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 53 (2015). 
 18. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 66. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
JUSTICE IN ROBES 15 (2006) (“Any lawyer has built up, through education, training, and 
experience, his own sense of when an interpretation fits well enough to count as an 
interpretation rather than an invention . . . .”). See also Imer B. Flores, The Legacy of 
Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013): A Legal Theory and Methodology for Hedgehogs, Hercules, 
and One Right Answers, 9 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 
157, 174–76 (2015) (accentuating the interpretive-not-inventive nature of Dworkin’s 
model) [hereinafter Flores, The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin].   
 19. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 4. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). See also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007); Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS 
AM. ASSOC. POL. SCI. 29 (1936). 
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qualification in the kind of interpretation that he has in mind to 
isolate himself from the so-called “originalists,” who insist on 
rejecting the notion of a “living constitution”20 by making “the 
contemporary Constitution too much the dead hand of the past.”21 
Succinctly, interpretation has to be a “creative” judicial activity—
an exercise of “constructive interpretation”—that is 
“interpretive,” not “inventive,” “legislative,” and as such a form 
of “judicial invention or legislation.”22 In Dworkin’s words: 
“[C]onstructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on 
an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible 
example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”23 It 
is worth noting that legal interpretation, including constitutional 
interpretation, is by definition creative and even constructive, i.e., 
giving meaning and sense to a legal principle or rule.24 
 
 20. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA]; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); William H. Rehnquist, The 
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976), reprinted in 29 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 401 (2006). 
 21. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 14. See JAMES E. FLEMING, 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION vii (2015) (quoting Antonin Scalia: “[The 
Constitution is] not a living document. It’s dead, dead, dead.”).  
 22. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221–22 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I 
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially; they are confined from ‘molar to molecular motions.’”); H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 200, 205 (2d ed. 1994) (“Laws require interpretation if they are to be 
applied to concrete cases, and once the myths which obscure the nature of the judicial 
processes are dispelled by realistic study, it is patent . . . that the open texture of law leaves 
a vast field for a creative activity which some call legislative.”). See also Imer B. Flores, 
H.L.A. Hart’s Moderate Indeterminacy Thesis Reconsidered: In Between Scylla and 
Charybdis, 5 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 147, 170 
(2011) (criticizing Hart’s indeterminacy thesis and defending Dworkin’s determinacy 
thesis, by introducing a distinction between “interpretive,” “inventive,” “legislative,” or 
“creative judicial activity”). 
 23. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 11, at 52. See Dworkin, The Arduous 
Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 4, at 1252 (“[Constructive interpretation] does not mean 
peeking inside the skulls of people dead for centuries. It means trying to make the sense 
we can of an historical event—someone, or a social group with particular responsibilities, 
speaking or writing in a particular way on a particular occasion.”). See also Flores, The 
Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1173–74 (emphasizing the constructive 
nature of Dworkin’s model). 
 24. See Imer B. Flores, ¿Es el derecho un modelo aplicativo? [Is Law an Applicative 
Model?], in LA FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO HOY [PHILOSOPHY OF LAW TODAY] (Juan 
Federico et al. eds., 2010). 
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Not surprisingly, some originalists resist the idea of a 
“constructive interpretation,” and have tried to maintain a sharp 
distinction between (constitutional) interpretation and 
(constitutional) construction: that which is (constitutional) 
interpretation cannot be (constitutional) construction, and vice 
versa.25 Hence, this argument not only claims that what courts do 
or should do is (constitutional) interpretation, whereas what 
legislatures do or should do is (constitutional) construction, but 
also suggests that originalist judges, by doing (constitutional) 
interpretation, instead of (constitutional) construction, are the 
only ones that can remain faithful to the Constitution, whilst the 
others are unfaithful and even infidels pronouncing heresies, 
revisions, subversions, and so on.26 
Actually, as Fleming points out, there are “several competing 
conceptions of fidelity,” namely: (1) “ . . . as pursuing integrity 
with the moral reading of the Constitution” (Ronald Dworkin); 
(2) “as synthesis of constitutional moments” (Bruce Ackerman); 
(3) “as translation across generations” (Lawrence Lessig); (4) “as 
keeping faith with the founders’ vision” (Jack Rakove); and (5) 
“[as keeping faith] to abstract text and principle” (Jack Balkin) 
(p. 11).27 
Nevertheless, Dworkin is absolutely right when he gives a 
word of caution: “If courts try to be faithful to the text of the 
Constitution, they will for that very reason be forced to decide 
between competing conceptions of political morality.”28 His 
counsel is one of fidelity, honesty and responsibility, by displaying 
the true grounds of judgment instead of concealing them or even 
pretending that no judgment was made and so no need to take 
responsibility for it. Let me quote Dworkin at length: 
 
 25. See Larry Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in LARRY SOLUM AND ROBERT 
W. BENNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM. A DEBATE 3 (2011) [hereinafter Solum, 
We Are All Originalists Now] (“Many originalists believe that it is important to distinguish 
between two distinct aspects of constitutional practice: constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction.”) (emphasis in original). See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).  
 26. See, e.g., BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 20. 
 27. See Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 8, at 1337. 
 28. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 11, at 136; Dworkin, The 
Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, supra note 12. 
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I not only concede but emphasize that constitutional opinion is 
sensitive to political conviction . . . . Constitutional politics has 
been confused and corrupted by a pretense that judges . . . 
could use politically neutral strategies of constitutional 
interpretation. Judges who join in that pretense try to hide the 
inevitable influence of their own convictions even from 
themselves, and the result is a costly mendacity. The actual 
grounds of decision are hidden from both legitimate public 
inspection and valuable public debate. The moral reading 
offers different counsel. It explains why fidelity to the 
Constitution and to law demands that judges make 
contemporary judgments of political morality, and it therefore 
encourages an open display of the true grounds of judgment, in 
the hope that judges will construct franker arguments of 
principle that allow the public to join in the argument. So of 
course the moral reading encourages lawyers and judges to 
read an abstract constitution in the light of what they take to 
be justice.29 
III.FLEMING’S FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT 
CONSTITUTION:  MORAL READINGS V. 
ORIGINALISMS (AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISMS) 
In his article “Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,”30 
Fleming pointed out that the topic for the “Fidelity in 
Constitutional Theory” Symposium raised two fundamental 
questions: fidelity to what? and what is fidelity?31 The short answer 
to the first—”fidelity to the Constitution”—pointed to a further 
question: what is the Constitution?32 Similarly, the short answer to 
the second—”being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting 
it”—posed another question: how should the Constitution be 
interpreted?33 Certainly, the two questions what is interpreted? and 
how it is or should be interpreted?, along with the question of who 
is to interpret?, are the basic interrogatives of constitutional 
interpretation.34 
On this regard, I would like to make the importance of the 
third one explicit, since I am fully convinced—following 
Dworkin’s lead—that in a (constitutional) democracy or 
 
 29. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 37 (emphasis in original). 
 30. See Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 8, at 1335. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. See also WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (5th ed. 2013). 
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democratic system, everyone—judges, legislators, lawyers, 
citizens and other public officials—are to interpret the 
Constitution, rejecting an exclusive attribution to or the 
monopoly of a person or group.35 In that sense, since there will be 
countless interpretations, the question evolves into at least two 
different questions: who is to interpret authoritatively?,36 as well as, 
who is to interpret correctly?37 
In spite of the “majoritarian premise” and the so-called 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty,”38 almost all of our 
contemporary democracies, including those in transition from 
authoritarian regimes, have entrusted the responsibility of 
authoritative interpretation to judges sitting in constitutional, 
higher, or supreme courts and tribunals, which Dworkin rightly 
conceives as “the forum of principle.”39 Notwithstanding, he 
clarified that: “I do not mean, of course, that only judges should 
discuss matters of high political principle. Legislatures are 
guardians of principles too, and that includes constitutional 
principle.”40 
Dworkin was adamant in his insistence that it is imperative 
to reject the “majoritarian premise” and the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” that reinforces the “majoritarian 
 
 35. See Imer B. Flores, Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional 
Democracy), in LAW, LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 78 (Imer B. Flores & Kenneth E. 
Himma eds., 2013). 
 36. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 2 (“But political morality is 
inherently uncertain and controversial, so any system of government that makes such 
principles part of its law must decide whose interpretation and understanding will be 
authoritative.”).  
 37. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 11, at 279 (“My 
argument supposes that there is often a single right answer to complex questions of law 
and political morality. The objection replies that there is sometimes no single right answer, 
but only answers.”). See also Flores, The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, supra note 18, at 181–
85; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 84 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977) (“For all practical 
purposes, there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.”); Ronald 
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 87, 136 
(1996) (“This ‘no right answer’ thesis cannot be true by default in law any more than in 
ethics or aesthetics or morals.”).   
 38. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 18 (2d ed. 1986).  
 39. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981), 
reprinted in DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 16, at 33. See also Imer B. 
Flores, Assessing Democracy and Rule of Law: Access to Justice, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
21ST IVR WORLD CONGRESS, LUND (SWEDEN), AUGUST 12–17, 2003, PART I: JUSTICE 
146 (Alexander Peczenik ed., 2004) (responding to the counter-majoritarian objection). 
 40. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 31. 
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conception” of democracy, and instead replace it with the 
“partnership conception” of democracy, which “means 
government by all the people, acting together as full and equal 
partners in a collective enterprise of self-government.”41 
Accordingly, it is also necessary to transcend the debate 
about who is or should be the absolute or final authoritative 
interpreter: the legislator or the judge?42 Actually, both have a 
very important duty, either to legislate political rights (and 
constitutional norms that remain under-enforced) or adjudicate 
legal rights, in both cases according to the Constitution and the 
law.43 In a democracy, everyone has and must have its share: it 
implies a division of labor.44 
Additionally, it is not a matter of who is or should be the 
absolute or final authoritative interpreter, but of who is or should 
be to interpret correctly? Let me suggest that this last question 
conflates with the question: how it is or should be interpreted? Or, 
alternatively: which is the best or better interpretation? In other 
 
 41. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 358 (2000) (emphasis in original). See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 382–85 (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS]; 
RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE 131–37 (2006); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 15–19; 
Ronald Dworkin, The Partnership Conception of Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 453 (1998). 
See also JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
102–03 (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1861); Imer B. Flores, Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for 
Hedgehogs and Partnership Conception of Democracy (With a Comment to Jeremy 
Waldron’s “A Majority in the Lifeboat”), 4 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y 
TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 65, 73–76, 79–81 (2010). 
 42. See John Chipman Grey, A Realist Conception of Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
50 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d ed. 1986) (“Whoever hath an absolute authority 
to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver to all intent and 
purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.”) (emphasis added). See also 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).  
 43. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 41, at 405–07, 412–13. See 
also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 44. See Imer B. Flores, The Quest for Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism, 
in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION: ESSAYS ON LEGISPRUDENCE 26–52 
(Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2005); Imer B. Flores, Legisprudence: The Role and Rationality of 
Legislators—vis-à-vis Judges—Towards the Realization of Justice, 1 MEX. L. REV. N. S. 91 
(2009); Imer B. Flores, The Living Tree Constitutionalism: Fixity and Flexibility, 3 
PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 37 (2009) [hereinafter 
Flores, Living Tree Constitutionalism]; Imer B. Flores, Legisprudence: The Forms and 
Limits of Legislation, 1 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 
247 (2007).  
5 - FLORES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16  10:47 AM 
2016] INTELLIGENT FIDELITY? 417 
 
words: is there a right answer or not? Originalists assume that 
their interpretation is the best or better one—and even the only 
one—because they are in the grip of what Fleming calls the 
“originalist premise,” i.e., “the assumption that originalism, 
rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of 
fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the 
assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the 
best—or indeed the only—conception of constitutional 
interpretation” (p. 7).45 
Clearly, Fleming reacts to the “originalist premise” and 
rejects all forms of originalisms, regardless of whether they are 
concerned with the original meaning or public meaning of the 
text, the original intention or understanding of the drafters, 
framers or ratifiers, the original applications or expectations, 
original methods or the like, and reconnoiters all the variants, 
including old or new, strong or weak, exclusive or inclusive, living 
or dead, broad or narrow, abstract or concrete (pp. 2-3).46  
A clarification is in order: Fleming appears to be sympathetic 
with some forms of originalism, i.e., inclusive, living, broad and 
abstract, as long as they can be reformulated as or compatible with 
moral readings, and as such can be welcomed into the big tent of 
moral readings. We will return to this point in the last part of this 
Article. Nevertheless, the structure of the book is quite simple and 
very straightforward. 
In Chapter 1, “Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!,” 
which serves as introduction to the book, Fleming expands his 
homonymous article47 to update his responses to this question. 
Especially, to those like Lawrence Solum, who answer this 
question affirmatively, and to those, like William Baude, who—
following Elena Kagan’s concession, at her confirmation hearing, 
that “we are all originalists”—reframes the question as “Is 
originalism our law?” to answer: “Yes, at least in a presumptive 
sense, its deep structure is a nuanced form of originalism.”48 In 
this chapter Fleming also incorporates the core of another article, 
 
 45. See Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 8, at 1344 
(emphasis added).   
 46. See id. 
 47. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1785 (2013). 
 48. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) 
(citation omitted). 
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“The Balkinization of Originalism,”49 in which he points out the 
main problem of the all-inclusive tent of and for originalists, with 
a brilliant pun: “the Balkanization of originalism and the 
Balkinization of originalism”(p. 2). In a few words, he suggests: 
“we are witnessing the ‘Balkanization’ of originalism (when 
originalism splits into warring camps) and the ‘Balkinization’ of 
originalism (when even Balkin, hitherto a pragmatist living 
constitutionalist, becomes an originalist)”50 (p. 2). 
In Part One, “The New Originalism and Its Originalist 
Discontent,” Fleming challenges new originalism and examines its 
originalist discontent. Along these lines, in Chapter 2, “The New 
Originalist Manifesto,”51 he exposes and criticizes the “new 
originalist manifesto,” as redefined or refined elegantly by Solum 
around four basic ideas: 1) The fixation thesis; 2) The public 
meaning thesis; 3) The textual constraint thesis; and 4) The 
interpretation-construction distinction. Fleming is absolutely right 
that these ideas represent a problem for originalists, especially the 
fourth, which gives room for a “construction zone” that lies 
beyond originalism and requires, by definition, normative 
judgments, and, as such, is considered as a capitulation in favor—
for different reasons—of both living constitutionalisms and moral 
readings, and contributes to generate discontent among old and 
even contemporary originalists (pp. 28–29). 
Similarly, in Chapter 3, “Fidelity, Change, and the Good 
Constitution,”52 he corroborates that new originalism has 
provoked a pushback within originalism, with the appearance of 
the “original methods originalism” and the reappearance of the 
“old-time originalism,” and demonstrates that the reasons for 
aspiration to fidelity correspond to the moral reading or 
philosophical approach that conceives fidelity as honoring our 
commitments to “abstract aspirational principles,” not concrete 
 
 49. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669 
(2012) [hereinafter Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism]. 
 50. Id. at 670; James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 
10 (2007). See, e.g., Mitchel N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(distinguishing seventy-two varieties of originalism). See also JACK BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011) (expressing a willingness to occupy the intermediate position 
between originalism and living constitutionalism by renaming his position “living 
originalism”). 
 51. See James E. Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539 
(2013). 
 52. James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 515 (2014).  
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or specific ones. As Dworkin puts it: “We have to choose between 
an abstract, principled moral reading . . .  and a concrete, dated, 
reading.”53 
In Part Two, “A Moral Reading or Philosophical Approach,” 
Fleming defines and defends his moral reading or philosophical 
approach as an alternative to originalism. In Chapter 4, “Fidelity 
Through a Moral Reading or Philosophical Approach,” he 
develops his substantive and interpretative theory, and responds 
to objections to it; and in Chapter 5, “The Place of Precedent and 
Common-Law Constitutional Interpretation,” he reiterates a 
conclusion present ever since the publication of “Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution,” namely that, “[h]istory is, can only be, 
and should only be a starting point in constitutional 
interpretation.”54 
Let me also call your attention to a passage of Antonin 
Scalia’s Tanner Lecture, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting 
the Constitution and Laws”: 
[T]he common law grew in a peculiar fashion—rather like a 
Scrabble board. No rule of decision previously announced 
could be erased, but qualifications could be added to it. The 
first case lays on the board: “No liability for breach of 
contractual duty without privity’ the next player adds ‘unless 
injured party is member of household.” And the game 
continues.55 
As you can imagine, I am fully convinced that since history 
cannot be erased but only added, Fleming is certainly right: 
“[h]istory is, can only be, and should only be a starting point in 
constitutional interpretation . . . ,” and not the ending point or 
finishing line (p. 2). Recall Oliver Wendell Holmes’ celebrated 
article, “The Path of Law”, where he, on the one hand, admitted:  
At present, in very many cases, if we want to know why a rule 
of law has taken its particular shape, and more or less if we 
want to know why it exists at all we go to tradition . . . . The 
 
 53. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 4, at 1253. 
 54. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, supra note 8, at 1350. 
 55. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 8 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(emphasis in original). 
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rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. 
History must be a part of the study.  
On the other hand, he warned: “Everywhere the basis of 
principle is tradition, to such an extent that we even are in danger 
of making the role of history more important than it is.”56 
In Part Three, “Living Originalism and Living 
Constitutionalism as Moral Readings,” Fleming recasts, or at least 
tries to recast, some theories as moral readings and theorists as 
moral readers: in Chapter 6, “Fidelity through Living Originalism: 
Redeeming the Promises of the Constitution”—Jack Balkin’s 
living originalism—and in Chapter 7, “Fidelity to Our Living 
Constitution: Honoring the Achievements of We the People”—
Bruce Ackerman’s living constitutionalism. The problem for 
Fleming is that both authors, despite assuming the existence of 
abstract principles, have long resisted the moral reading and its 
implications in favor of pragmatic considerations.57 
In Part Four, “Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,” 
Fleming reconsiders the pragmatic argument that it is time to 
rewrite the United States Constitution based on the argument 
that it is imperfect. On the contrary, he argues that the better 
approach is to maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect 
Constitution, and to apply a constitutional-perfecting theory that 
interprets the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. 
Finally, in “Epilogue: Accepting our Responsibility,” 
Fleming concludes with a call to accept responsibility for making 
normative judgments and welcoming those who are willing to 
accept it into the moral reading tent: 
 
 56. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), 
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1001–03 (1997). See Imer B. Flores, The Problem 
About the Nature of Law vis-à-vis Legal Rationality Revisited: Towards An Integrative 
Jurisprudence, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 101 (Wil 
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013).   
 57. I confess to at one time also thinking that Ackerman’s living constitutionalisms 
and Balkin’s synthetizing originalism and living constitutionalism project, i.e. living 
originalism, were compatibles with a Dworkinian moral reading approach. Since, I have 
come to conclude that they are not, as we will see in the last part of this Article. See Flores, 
The Living Tree Constitutionalism, supra note 44, at 41, 74 (commenting on WILFRID J. 
WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LIVING TREE 
(2007)). By the by, the “living tree” metaphor, suggesting both fixity and flexibility, can be 
traced all the way back to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 56–57 (Hackett 1978) (1859) 
(“Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work 
prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according 
to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.”).  
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Moral readers accept our responsibility not to retreat from 
interpreting the Constitution so as to fulfill the promise of our 
commitments to abstract aspirational principles such as liberty 
and equality—not to retreat to originalism. We appreciate that 
the aspiration to fidelity requires citizens, scholars, and judges 
not to avoid or evade the responsibility to make normative 
judgments about the best understanding of those commitments 
(p. 191). 
IV.CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY, INTERPRETATION, 
AND IMPERFECTION:  INTELLEGENT OR 
UNINTELLEGENT? 
Let me make explicit that Fleming’s apt title for his article 
and book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, has implicit in it 
three very helpful dichotomies to distinguish the different 
theories: (1) fidelity and anti-fidelity; (2) interpretation and non-
interpretation, i.e., (re)construction, (re)invention and (judicial) 
legislation; and (3) perfection-imperfection. 
Accordingly, “originalists” assume that they are the only 
ones that can have fidelity to the Constitution as written, by 
limiting themselves to the interpretation of the Constitution, 
which somehow is and remains a symbol of perfection. On the 
contrary, “living constitutionalists” assume an anti-fidelity 
position, suggesting that it is time to rewrite the Constitution, by 
a pragmatic process of non-interpretation through 
(re)construction, (re)invention and (judicial) legislation, due to its 
imperfection.  Finally, moral readers (like Fleming and myself) 
assume that they (we) also have fidelity to the Constitution as 
written, to the extent that the best or better approach is to 
continue with its interpretation, recognizing that it is not a symbol 
of perfection, but of imperfection. 
By now, it is clear that the kind of interpretation that moral 
readers and originalists have in mind is very different: a 
constructive interpretation for moral readers, on one side, and a 
mere applicative interpretation for originalists, on the other. 
However, the kind of fidelity in question is still not that evident. 
So, the remaining or underlying question is: what kind of fidelity? 
My response, following Lon L. Fuller’s distinction between 
intelligent and unintelligent fidelity, is unsurprising: intelligent 
fidelity. The distinction can be traced to a passage of his piece 
“The Case of the Speluncean Explorers”: 
5 - FLORES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/16  10:47 AM 
422 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:407 
 
There are those who raise the cry of judicial usurpation 
whenever a court, after analyzing the purpose of a statute, gives 
its words a meaning that is not at once apparent to the casual 
reader who has not studied the statute closely or examined the 
objectives it seeks to attain. Let me say emphatically that I 
accept without reservation the proposition that this Court is 
bound by the statutes of our Commonwealth and that it 
exercises its powers in subservience to the duly expressed will 
of the Chamber of Representatives. The line of reasoning I 
have applied above raises no question of fidelity to enacted 
law, though it may possibly raise a question of the distinction 
between intelligent and unintelligent fidelity. No superior 
wants a servant who lacks the capacity to read between the 
lines. The stupidest housemaid knows that when she is told “to 
peel the soup and skin the potatoes” her mistress does not 
mean what she says. She also knows that when her master tells 
her to “drop everything and come running” he has overlooked 
the possibility that she is at the moment in the act of rescuing 
the baby from the rain barrel. Surely we have a right to expect 
the same modicum of intelligence from the judiciary. The 
correction of obvious legislative errors or oversights is not to 
supplant the legislative will, but to make that will effective.58  
The relevance of the distinction between intelligent and 
unintelligent fidelity is also captured in the following quotation 
from Dworkin: “The moral reading insists that they 
misunderstood the moral principle that they themselves enacted 
into law. The originalist strategy would translate that mistake into 
enduring constitutional law.”59 
To conclude, let me recall that I concurred with Fleming, in 
his response to the question: Are we all originalists now? “I hope 
not,” and to his rhetorical question: Are we all moral readers now? 
I answer, “I believe not and hope not.” Somehow my idea has been 
that not everyone is willing to admit that they are making moral 
readings, i.e., normative judgments, and much less willing to 
accept their responsibility for doing so. Once they admit and 
accept it, as Fleming suggests, we all will be moral readers, 
welcomed in a big tent to sing along. 
 
 58. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625–
26 (1949), reprinted in 112 HARV. L. REV. 1851 (1999). 
 59. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 3, at 13. 
